Stefano Romanello, «Rom 7,7-25 and the Impotence of the Law. A Fresh Look at a Much-Debated Topic Using Literary-Rhetorical Analysis», Vol. 84 (2003) 510-530
By means of a literary-rhetorical analysis, it can be stated that Rom 7,7-25 forms a literary unit, depending upon the propositio of Rom 7,7a. In fact, the question on the possible equalization between Mosaic Law and sin raises a new discussion, carried out precisely in Rom 7,7-25. The climax of the pericope appears to be the powerless character of the Law with respect to sin, depicted through two different examples. In the first one, in vv. 7-13, it is not stated that through the Law sin become known by the "I", but that through the Law sin gains force and becomes ineluctably effective. In the second one, in vv. 14-25, sin is an active subject quite apart from Law, that remains nevertheless ineffective in counteracting it. In any case, these two different depictions point both to the ineffectiveness of the Law. The affirmations on the positive nature of the Law are incorporated in this pericope in order to be diminished –even if not denied. This rhetorical strategy can be called concessio. In Rom 8,1-17 the believer’s life is depicted in different terms from the life of the "I" of Rom 7,7-25. This comparison leads to the recognition of the new basis on which our relation with God becomes possible. In the meantime, it clarifies that the Law cannot promote this new identity in believers. For this reason, emphasis on the incapacity of the Law must not be considered as an act of contempt for it. Instead, it clarifies the objective reasons why the Law cannot be regarded as a soteriological principle.
solve the problem. The answer comes in v. 7c, which is stated in a way parallel to the previous verse and stands as an intepretation of it. It affirms that the Law, forbidding desire, actually awakens it or, more precisely, awakens "every kind of desire" (v. 8a). As "desire" (e)piqumi/a) stands in parallel with "sin" in v. 7, and as it is forbiddenby the Law, by "desire" one must here understand "sinful desire". Furthermore, as the Law has already pronounced the commandment "do not desire", the conditional clause must be intended as unreal in the past, notwithstanding the absence of a)n in the apodosis. The main point here is that by pronouncing its commandment, the Law brings about sinful desire. The way in which the Law does so is quickly bypassed by Paul: one may refer to the desire for forbidden things, but it is clear that he does not direct the reader’s attention to this matter. What emerges with clarity from these assertions is: 1) the Law in itself is not sinful inasmuch as it forbids what is sinful — surely a positive characteristic11; 2) paradoxically, in so doing it awakens in man what it forbids, by feeding the sin which it should be fighting. The knowledge to which v. 7 refers, which in itself could also be evaluated in different terms, proves to be a pragmatic one: the Law makes sin be known because it makes it practicable. From v. 8 onwards this state of things is ascribed to sin itself, which is personified and proves to be the ultimate factor of its own empowerment, which might well be taken to be a disclaimer of the Law. It nevertheless remains true that sin operates through the commandment, and that, despite its positive nature, the Law increases the possibilities of sin. The dia_ th=j e)ntolh=j statement in v. 8a recalls the dia_ tou= no/mou statement in v. 5, but this kind of affirmation is a causative one, that is to say it restates the instrumentality of Law in increasing sin itself. At this point it is necessary to deduce that what constitutes a problem in former Pauline statements, that is the relationship between Law and sin, is here merely affirmed again, despite the denial of the equalisation between these two entities. If this is the case, then the negative statement in v. 7a is not simply restated, but the development of the argument underlines