Stefano Romanello, «Rom 7,7-25 and the Impotence of the Law. A Fresh Look at a Much-Debated Topic Using Literary-Rhetorical Analysis», Vol. 84 (2003) 510-530
By means of a literary-rhetorical analysis, it can be stated that Rom 7,7-25 forms a literary unit, depending upon the propositio of Rom 7,7a. In fact, the question on the possible equalization between Mosaic Law and sin raises a new discussion, carried out precisely in Rom 7,7-25. The climax of the pericope appears to be the powerless character of the Law with respect to sin, depicted through two different examples. In the first one, in vv. 7-13, it is not stated that through the Law sin become known by the "I", but that through the Law sin gains force and becomes ineluctably effective. In the second one, in vv. 14-25, sin is an active subject quite apart from Law, that remains nevertheless ineffective in counteracting it. In any case, these two different depictions point both to the ineffectiveness of the Law. The affirmations on the positive nature of the Law are incorporated in this pericope in order to be diminished –even if not denied. This rhetorical strategy can be called concessio. In Rom 8,1-17 the believer’s life is depicted in different terms from the life of the "I" of Rom 7,7-25. This comparison leads to the recognition of the new basis on which our relation with God becomes possible. In the meantime, it clarifies that the Law cannot promote this new identity in believers. For this reason, emphasis on the incapacity of the Law must not be considered as an act of contempt for it. Instead, it clarifies the objective reasons why the Law cannot be regarded as a soteriological principle.
absurd eventuality, contradicted not only by common sense, but explicitly by Paul himself in Rom 5,12-14. For these reasons it becomes tempting to qualify the value of these assertions in some way. The most obvious way to do this is to affirm a kind of cognitive, not causative, function of the Law with regard to the self-revelation of sin18. But in this chapter it is precisely through the Law that sin becomes operative, while the subject becomes conscious of the power of sin through his experience of it. So the Law is primarily involved in the process of the self-revelation of sin, not in the subject’s attainment of self-awareness. This conclusion may well be implicit, but it is only a consequence which the argumentation does not invite the reader to dwell upon. Furthermore, it is stated that it is only through the commandment that sin kills the subject. How is it possible to detect a cognitive function in such an utterance? So although a number of questions remain unresolved at the moment, a first step for the interpretation of the chapter is to assume that these verses have stated the causative function of the Law. Clearly, this cannot be squared with the starting disclaimer of the Law.
III. The development of the argumentation
in vv. 14-25; some remarks
V. 13 functions as a turning point between the first part and second part of the pericope. The question with which the verse begins in itself arouses new interest in the reader. However, rather than stating anything really new with respect to what has been said, it seems simply to restate the basic problem mentioned in v. 7a. Interpreters usually assume that here Paul is asking whether the Law has become the cause of the subject’s death, and rules out this possibility by ascribing the full responsibility of the killing process to sin19. This view seems to me rather unconvincing. In the previous verses sin has already borne the ultimate responsibility for the subject’s death, so that interpretation would render the present question redundant. Furthermore, the answer in v. 13 does not add clarifications on the responsibility of sin which have not already been provided in vv. 7-12. New ideas could perhaps be detected if the two final clauses are read as expression of a divine