T.B. Williams, «Reading Social Conflict through Greek Grammar: Reconciling the Difficulties of the Fourth-Class Condition in 1 Pet 3,14.», Vol. 26 (2013) 109-126
For the most part, it is assumed that in the Koine period the fourth-class condition indicated a future contingency with a possible or, in many cases, only a remote chance of fulfillment (e.g., “if this could happen”). If this meaning is applied to the condition in 1 Pet 3,14, it seems to imply not the reality of suffering, but merely the remote possibility, which is at odds with the popular understanding of the epistle’s social situation. This study is an attempt to examine the meaning of the fourth-class condition in 1 Pet 3,14 and its function(s) within the larger Petrine argument, a task which not only sheds light on the interpretation of 1 Pet 3,13-17, but also provides the unity of the epistle with some much-needed substantiation.
120 Travis B. Williams
But despite any hesitancy that might be involved in going against such
a strong majority, we would like to propose an alternate interpretation.
Rather than functioning as a restatement of the previous sentence, we
would suggest that v. 14a serves as a qualification of the more general,
all-encompassing statement found in v. 13. This is seen in both the
conjunction used to connect the two verses (ἀλλά) and in the conditional
element of v. 14a. The presence of ἀλλά at the beginning of v. 14a signifies
that the rule in v. 13 (doing good = the avoidance of harm) is not without
exceptions. While harm is ordinarily avoided through proper conduct,
this may not always be the case. Verse 14a acknowledges these exceptions
and then spells out the consequences of the rule’s contradiction. The idea
seems to be, “the one who is zealous for good will not be harmed, but if
this does occur . . . ”
The conditional element in v. 14a also reveals its role as a qualification.
Elsewhere, when this same construction (εἰ καί + optative) appears, it
normally serves to qualify a general principle or a seemingly unswerving
promise29. This is due to the fact that καί appears within the conditional
element (“even if”). Philo’s explanation of the relationship between
virtuous living and bodily ailment provides a very close parallel both
grammatically and conceptually:
Therefore, [Moses] says that to those who practice virtue and who make
the sacred laws their chief concern in the words and deeds of their lives,
both privately and publicly, [God] will grant freedom from sickness in every
respect. But even if any ailment should arise (εἰ δὲ καὶ γένοιτό τις ἀσθένεια),
it will not be for the sake of injuring them but to remind the mortal that he
is mortal . . . (Praem. 119)
Even though Philo states unswervingly that virtuous living would
prevent all sickness and disease, he is able to turn back around and offer
a qualification to this (seemingly) inflexible principle30. This is exactly
how 1 Pet 3,14a functions in its present context. Following on the heels
of the confident assertion in v. 13, the verse describes the possibility and
29
E.g., Isa 49,15 (LXX); 4 Macc 14,17; Let. Aris. 297; Philo Post. 115; Praem. 119; Leg.
3,176; Fug. 160; Mos. 1,68; Legat. 117. 192. 339; Jos. Ant. 2,326; 15,36. 101. 164. 277. 284bis;
Bell. 2,443; 3,44. 298.
30
Compare similar examples: “Will a woman forget her child so as to show no mercy to
the offspring of her womb? But even if a woman might forget these (εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιλάθοιτο
ταῦτα γυνή), yet I will not forget you, says the Lord” (Isa 49,15 [LXX]), and “Therefore,
it is not proper to lie concerning the public records; but even if I were going to transgress
in a certain area (εἰ δὲ καί τι παραβαίην), it would not be in such a holy matter as this”
(Let. Aris. 297).