Andrey Romanov, «Through One Lord Only: Theological Interpretation of the Meaning of 'dia', in 1 Cor 8,6», Vol. 96 (2015) 391-415
The present study attempts to clarify the theological meaning of dia, in 1 Cor 8,6. Traditionally the preposition is understood as an indication of a contrast between God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ. Jesus' role is described as either instrumental or analogous to the role of Jewish Wisdom. The present study questions these interpretations on the basis of the analysis of the structure of the verse. In this author's opinion, dia, here indicates the unique functions of Jesus Christ which make him the co-worker of God the Father in both creation and salvation.
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401 THROUGH ONE LORD ONLY 401
that is, the speculative pattern of God’s activity 31. As Sterling notes,
“the distinction between agent and instrument [in Middle Platonism]
has been obscured by the close relationship between nou/j and
lo,goj in Middle Platonic thought” 32. This poses a question: who
or what is Philo’s Logos or Jewish Sophia? Is he/she an independent
entity who is used (like a real tool) by God? Or is the Logos/Sophia
another form of the description of God himself, i.e. God’s self-
realization which is called “Logos” or “Sophia” in order to stress
God’s deliberate action in the world? Philo’s texts do not provide
an immediate answer. Indeed, in Cher. 126 Philo makes a parallel
between God’s creation and the building of a house or a city; the
instrument here looks like a physical tool of the builder. But in Opif.
24-25 (and Fug. 101) God’s Logos is compared with an idea of
God, a thinkable phenomenon. In this case Philo’s Logos recalls
Varro’s exemplum, “the pattern according to which (secundum
quod) something came to be” 33. Horsley calls Logos “the instrumen-
tal principle” 34 and seemingly through this lofty formula tries to
avoid a discussion of the nature of Logos; this formula, however,
does not clarify the question of how the “principle” correlates with
the concrete person Jesus Christ, who in 1 Cor 8,6 is clearly distin-
guished from God 35.
31
In fact, the instrumental cause seems to be a speculative invention of
Middle Platonists (as an addition to a standard Aristotelian system of causes)
and may be characterized as “the idea”; see J. DILLON, The Middle Platonists.
80 B.C. to 220 A.D. (Ithaca, NY 1996) 140-143.
32
STERLING, “Prepositional Metaphysics”, 231.
33
See, R. COX, By the Same Word: Creation and Salvation in Hellenistic
Judaism and Early Christianity (Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestament-
liche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 145; Berlin – New York
2007) 43-44.
34
HORSLEY, “The Background”, 134.
35
The discussion concerning the nature of Philo’s Logos is endless indeed.
See, for instance, D. BOYARIN, “The Gospel of the Memra: Jewish Binitari-
anism and the Prologue to John”, HTR 94.3 (2001) 243-284, where he ques-
tions the influence of Middle Platonism on the formation of Philo’s idea of
Logos and recognizes in it “a doctrine of a deuteros theos” which, however,
did not preclude monotheism. Although the possible influence of Platonism
(in any of its forms) on Philo is a question for further research, the attempts to
present Philo’s Logos as an independent entity (not to say another God) are
not convincing, in my judgment. According to Philo, all things possess certain
kinds of logos (see, for instance, Opif. 43; cf. Opif. 69 where God’s Logos is