Paul Heger, «Source of Law in the Biblical and Mesopotamian Law Collections», Vol. 86 (2005) 324-342
This study argues that the source of the law constitutes the crucial ideological and
practical difference between man-made and God-given codices. In the
Mesopotamian codices, while the gods grant to the sovereign the authority to
govern, it is he who ultimately creates the relevant laws. He is thus the source of
the law and controls its application. God is the only source of biblical law, and is
involved in its implementation. This crucial difference has far-reaching
consequences. In particular, Mesopotamian laws focus on the redress of harm
done to humans and on disruption of human order; further, legal procedures,
sanctions and modes of compensation can be changed, forgiven or abolished.
Biblical law regards some infractions as harms against humans, but others are also
perceived as crimes against the Lord and a disruption of the divine order.
Punishments are fixed by God in both cases, and are eternal and inalterable.
Source of Law in the Biblical 331
is a cornerstone of the Israelite credo and constitutes, in my opinion,
the most essential distinction between the classical mythologies and
their view of the relationship between gods and humans, and the
Israelite conception. The Israelite laws founded upon this axiom bear
the same distinction.
b) Revisions of Laws and their Execution
Another decisive feature of the cuneiform laws is their ability to
be changed. The same power that promulgated the law has, by its
nature, the authority to alter them. Hammurapi, in his Epilogue, curses
the man who will “overturn the judgments that I rendered, change my
pronouncementâ€, and implores the gods to punish him. Such a state-
ment suggests that laws were or could be changed after the demise of
the king who promulgated them. Hittite laws, for instance, clearly
demonstrate reforms (35). It is a matter of scholarly debate whether such
changes always represent underlying development in sociological and
philosophical thought (36), or are limited to changes in prices and
penalties (37). I suggest that there are changes in legal thinking between
the different law collections (38).
In the Eshnunna Laws (LE), for instance, there is no public
corporal punishment or service to the king required in addition to the
appropriate settlement to the injured party. The public seems not to be
affected in a quarrel between two citizens. In the later Middle Assyrian
Laws, in contrast, we observe a well-organized society in which there
is a public interest in the private affairs of the citizens. We may note,
for instance, the complex administrative process for the acquisition of
real estate (MAL B 6), the corporal punishments and service to the
king for harmful acts against citizens (MAL B 14), and, on the other
hand, the public authority’s responsibility for the wellbeing of the
(35) The Late Version (c.1500 – 1180 BCE) parallels of a great number of
laws in the Old Version (c. 1650 – 1500 BCE) clearly demonstrate substantial
alterations.
(36) As suggested by S. GREENGUS, “Some Issues Relating to the Compat-
ibility of Laws and the Coherence of the Legal Traditionâ€, Theory and Method in
Biblical and Cuneiform Law, 60-87.
(37) As argued by R. WESTBROOK, “What is the Covenant Codeâ€â€˜, Theory and
Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law, 15-36.
(38) I follow here the opinion of P. Koschaker; see, e.g., the arguments
presented in Rechtsvergleichende Studien zur Gesetzgebung Hammurapis, Königs
von Babylon (Leipzig 1917).